

# Controversies and Polemics Involving the Sufi Orders in Twentieth-Century Indonesia

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## *Introduction*

The controversies and polemics that will be discussed in this chapter all took place in the context of the larger ongoing process of Islamic reform, the struggle against local custom and other alleged *bid`a* in belief and practice. This does not mean, however, that Sufis and reformists at any one time constituted two opposed blocks. In many of the cases under review, we shall find Sufi shaykhs pitted not against anti-Sufi reformists but against other Sufis; some of the fiercest debates, as we shall see below, in fact were internal to one of the orders, the Naqshbandiyya.

For an adequate understanding of the various conflicts between Indonesian Sufis and their opponents during the past century, it is useful to first take a closer look at the dynamics of the relationship between the Indonesian *umma* and the holy cities in the Hijaz. The observations that follow probably are valid for many other regions of the Muslim world as well (as is evident from several other contributions in this volume).

Both the Sufis and the reformists, at least until 1925, drew their inspiration from the centre of the Muslim world, Mecca and secondarily Medina. The most influential members of both categories had spent many years studying there and owed their influence in Indonesia primarily to this fact. At least since the seventeenth century and possibly earlier, there had been a community of Indonesian students and scholars in the holy cities, which acted as the chief mediators between the heartlands of Islam and their lands of origin. By the end of the nineteenth century, this community had reached a size of several thousand adults. Snouck Hurgronje, to whose fieldwork in Mecca we owe much of what we know of this community, observed that it constituted "the heart of the religious life of the entire East Indian Archipelago, pumping fresh blood to the entire body of the Indonesian *umma* through ever more veins at an ever increasing pace" (1889:391).

With one or two dubious exceptions, all Indonesian branches of

Sufi orders (*tarekat*) were introduced into the Archipelago from Mecca or Medina, usually by returning students.<sup>[1]</sup> Even such orders as the Shattariyya and Indian branches of the Naqshbandiyya reached Indonesia not directly from India but from the Haramayn. Moreover, the Indonesian branches of the great Sufi orders that thus were established never became fully independent and self-perpetuating. Such was the prestige of the holy cities that the *khalifa* of Indonesian shaykhs usually went to the Hijaz to get yet another *ijaza* from a Meccan or Medinan teacher. This process constituted an effective check on the ever-present tendencies towards syncretism and the assimilation of *tasawwuf* to indigenous mystical traditions. In each generation there were *tarekat* teachers who thus refreshed the links of their order with the Arabian source.

In this context it is not surprising that some of the returning *tarekat* teachers also gained reputations as reformists. In fact, virtually all of the protagonists in Azyumardi Azra's recent study of seventeenth and eighteenth-century Indonesian reformists (1992) were Sufis, affiliated with one or more *tarekat*. It has to be noted, however, that Azra uses the term 'reformist' in a wider sense than most other scholars; in his study it refers above all to efforts to replace monist mysticism by explicitly transcendentalist and *shari`a*-based belief and practice. Even in the period of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century reform, when in the Middle East much reformist zeal was directed against popular religious practices associated with the Sufi orders, some Sufi teachers returning from Mecca de facto acted as religious reformers in Indonesia.

It is not difficult to understand why this was so. In what from a Southeast Asian perspective appears as religious reform we may for the sake of analysis distinguish two independent components. The most important of these was the effort to bring belief and practice of the Indonesian Muslims more in line with those of the Muslims of Arabia, especially those in the Holy Cities, whose religion was assumed to be purer and more authentic. The second component, the importance of which has tended to be exaggerated by outside observers, is derivative of the various reformist and revivalist movements in the Middle East, from the Wahhabiyya through the Salafiyya to more recent movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and even the Iranian revolution. The introduction into Indonesia of such great Sufi orders as the Naqshbandiyya, Khalwatiyya, Qadiriyya and initially even the Shattariyya was part of the first component of this ongoing process of reform. Their role in bringing religious life in the Archipelago more in line with current Sunni orthodoxy and orthopraxis is clearly brought out in Azra's study.

Students and pilgrims returning from Arabia brought back more

than bookish learning and Sufi devotional practices. Numerous elements of Arabian (and Egyptian, and Indian) popular religion and lore encountered in the Holy Cities travelled the same way and little by little was integrated into Southeast Asian local custom (*adat*) and belief. Sociological studies of Java in the 1950s have drawn attention to a cultural and political cleavage dividing society into 'strict' and 'nominal' Muslims, or *santri* and *abangan* in the terms popularised by Clifford Geertz.<sup>[2]</sup> The 'strict' Muslims and, following them, foreign observers have tended to characterise all *abangan* religious beliefs and practices as pre-Islamic (or non-Islamic) but on closer inspection it soon becomes evident that many elements therein also derive from the Muslim world and are due to an earlier phase in the process of islamisation.<sup>[3]</sup> The *santri-abangan* cleavage of the 1950s and 1960s probably owed much to the politicisation of society in that period. In earlier periods, colonial sources do mention 'fanatical' *hajis* and *sayyids* representing *shari`a*-based (and sometimes anti-Dutch) Islam, but the common believers apparently constituted a continuum from the superficially to the highly islamised.

The debates between Indonesian Sufis and opponents that will be discussed below took place within the '*santri*' part of this spectrum. Certain Sufi ideas, however, have appealed to, and been adopted by, much wider circles. Elements of Hallaj's and Ibn `Arabi's monist mysticism, the concept of *nur Muhammad* and the idea of parallelism between macrocosm and microcosm, were easily assimilated to the older mystical traditions of local or Indic origins. The resulting syncretic mysticism, presently known as *kebatinan*, 'esotericism', accepts what it perceives as the inner dimension of Islamic teachings but rejects the *shari`a* as an irrelevant formality. This *kebatinan* mysticism constitutes an important part of the context in which the debates on Sufism in Indonesia took place. Some reformists have accused *tarekat* of being no more than heterodox *kebatinan* movements, the doctrine of *wahdat al-wujud* providing a pretext for laxity in worship. *Tarekat* teachers, on the other hand, have been forced to define and legitimise their positions as different from both the reformists' and the syncretists'.<sup>[4]</sup>

Speaking of the context of the debates, during the nineteenth century the most important aspect of this context clearly was the Dutch colonial expansion, which often met with local (Muslim) resistance and in the early twentieth century gave rise to the emergence of an Indonesian nationalist movement. After independence, as we shall see below, polemics on Sufism became embedded within the political struggle at the national level. Dutch colonialism, which had been established in Java and the Moluccas well before the nineteenth

century, went through a period of expansion in the second half of the nineteenth century; only by the early twentieth century was all of present Indonesia brought under effective Dutch control. During this same period, the number of Indonesians making the *hajj* appears to have risen rapidly, reaching annual averages of 6,000 by 1880 and of 15,000 by 1910. During the same period too, there was an increase in the number of Arab traders, especially from Hahramawt, travelling to and settling in the Archipelago, often taking up positions as religious teachers. These returning *hajjis* and Arab traders, especially the *sayyids* among the latter, constituted a potential counter-elite, competing for influence with the established religious authorities as well as, occasionally, the indigenous nobility. Many of the debates and controversies that we shall come across in this chapter can only be properly understood in the context of rivalry between religious leaders of different backgrounds.

### *Sufi orders and rebellion*

On repeated occasions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, we find several of the popular *tarekat* in Indonesia — the Sammaniyya, the Qadiriyya wa Naqshbandiyya, and once even the Shattariyya — thrown into the role of vessels of social protest and resistance against Dutch colonial expansion. This was not so much a reflection of any specific anticolonial teaching as of the internal structure of these *tarekat*, the mass following they had acquired, and the expectations that this mass following had of the magical effectiveness of the devotions taught by the *tarekat*.

The Sammaniyya probably was the first *tarekat* ever to gain a mass following in Indonesia, towards the close of the eighteenth century. By the mid-nineteenth century it was overshadowed by the Qadiriyya wa Naqshbandiyya, a quite similar new eclectic order established by a Mecca-based Indonesian teacher, Ahmad Khatib Sambas (*Ahmad b. `Abd al-Ghaffar al-Khatib al-Sambasi*). In the second half of the nineteenth century the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya gradually became the most important of the orders, the *zawiya* on Jabal Abu Qubays developing into the centre of a dense network covering Sumatra, Java and the other islands. It retained this position until the Sa`udi conquest of Mecca, which constitutes an important watershed in the history of Indonesian Islam.

The popularity of the Sammaniyya and the Qadiriyya wa Naqshbandiyya no doubt was to a large extent due to the reputation of Shaykh Samman and `Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani for supernatural intervention on behalf of their devotees. The loud, ecstatic *dhikr* of these orders and the invulnerability it was believed to impart were factors that impelled these *tarekat* towards their roles in anticolonial

and anti-aristocratic rebellions. Contrary to what in retrospect one would expect, these orders in their heyday never ran into opposition from circles of *fuqaha*. In fact, their Indonesian pioneers, Abdussamad Palembang (ʿAbd al-Samad al-Falimbani) and Ahmad Khatib Sambas, were equally known as scholars of *fiqh* as of *tasawwuf*.<sup>[5]</sup> It is only much later, from the 1920s on, that we encounter reformists frowning upon the ecstatic *dhikr* and the belief in the saints' intercession.

It was, surprisingly, the comparatively austere Naqshbandiyya Khalidiyya that first encountered stiff opposition from *fuqaha*. (I deliberately neglect here the earlier conflicts between 'government' ʿulama and 'heterodox' mystics described by Steenbrink in this volume, which may have been of a similar nature but which do not appear to have involved any of the great orders.) A brief look at the first polemics will indicate that we have here a conflict between two new types of religious leaders attempting to establish their authority rather than a properly theological debate.

#### *Arab scholars against the Naqshbandiyya*

Arabs from Hadramawt had been visiting the Indies for centuries as traders, often doubling as teachers of Islam, but until the nineteenth century their numbers had been rather limited. It was in the first half of the nineteenth century that their numbers had begun rapidly increasing and that they — especially the sayyids among them — successfully attempted to establish themselves among the Indonesians as superior religious authorities (van den Berg 1886).

In the early 1850s the West Sumatran Ismail Minangkabau (Ismaʿil al-Minangkabawi) returned to the Archipelago from Mecca, where he had become an assistant and *khalifa* to Mawlana Khalid's Meccan *khalifa* ʿAbdallah al-Arzinjani (see van Bruinessen 1990a, 1994a). He was welcomed with great honours by the highest indigenous authorities in Singapore and was soon invited to the court of peninsular Riau, one of the last independent indigenous kingdoms, where the entire ruling family became his disciples. He travelled as far north as the Malay state of Kedah and apparently found a following on the island of Penang as well (Holle 1886:67, 69-76). These successes must have been the direct reason for a polemical tract against him written by the leading Arab scholar then residing in Singapore, Salim b. ʿAbdallah b. Sumayr al-Hadrami.<sup>[6]</sup> He accused Ismaʿil of spreading false doctrines, but did not appear to attack the *tarekat* as such.

No copies of Salim b. ʿAbdallah b. Sumayr's tract appear to be extant but it was in part incorporated in another anti-Naqshbandi

polemical tract written three decades later by the leading Arab *`alim* of Batavia in the 1880s, Sayyid Usman (*`Uthman b. `Abdallah b. `Aqil b. Yahya al-`Alawi*), who was much concerned over the growing influence of charismatic Naqshbandi teachers in West Java.

[7] Both Arab authors attempted to delegitimize the *tarekat* shaykhs' authority by asserting that they were deficient in bookish learning (as well as lacking Arab blood, but this was not stated explicitly), and that they accepted as their disciples all sorts of people who had insufficient knowledge of the fundamentals of Islam. Whereas Salim b. *`Abdallah b. Sumayr*'s pamphlet of 1853 had been an indictment of the person of Isma`il Minangkabawi, Sayyid Usman directed his anger at the most influential contemporary Naqshbandi teacher in Mecca, Sulayman al-Zuhdi who, following a summary training in his *zawiya*, gave numerous Indonesian hajis *ijaza* as Naqshbandi adepts and appointed *khalifa* to many parts of the Archipelago.

Sayyid Usman emphasised, in a later pamphlet, that his criticism was not directed against *tasawwuf* and the *tarekat* as such, but against what he saw as their degeneration in modern times, against teachers who, out of sheer greed, claimed spiritual powers they did not have and who cheated their gullible *murid*. The recitation of *dhikr* and *wird* was, in the sayyid's view, a meritorious act, but one did not need the *ijaza* of a shaykh to recite them and they were purely devotional utterances, not magical formulas as many Indonesians believed. In order to break the shaykhs' monopoly of such pious formulas, Sayyid Usman himself published a booklet with prayers and *wird* allegedly taught by the Prophet himself.

### *Minangkabau reformists against the Naqshbandiyya*

These Arab authors then were not opponents of Sufism but of certain (in their view) would-be Sufis who failed to satisfy the high standards expected of proper Sufis. The next generation of critics went much further; they condemned the most central doctrines and practices of the Naqshbandiyya as *bid`a* and *shirk*. This attack no longer targeted specific teachers but the *tarekat* as such, along with many other traditionalist Islamic practices.

The most forceful attack came from one of the Minangkabau (West Sumatran) *`ulama* resident in Mecca, Ahmad Khatib (Ahmad b. *`Abd al-Latif al-Khatib al-Minangkabawi*, 1852-1915), who is especially known for his virulent criticism of the matrilineal *adat* of his own ethnic group.<sup>[8]</sup> In the years 1906-1908 he wrote three Malay tracts against the Naqshbandiyya, which were to constitute the source material for most subsequent anti-Naqshbandi polemics in Sumatra. The titles by themselves already show the register in which Ahmad



Khatib wrote: "Exposure of the deceivers' counterfeit in their imitation of the just", "Clear proofs to the righteous for the extirpation of the superstitions of certain fanatics", "The sharp-cutting sword that eradicates the utterances of certain presumptuous persons".

[9] He first argued that the very idea of a special teaching given by the Prophet to Abu Bakr, and handed down along the chain of tarekat teachers, is extremely unlikely, because such a thing is not mentioned in other sources than those of the Naqshbandiyya itself. Next, he discussed the various devotions of the Naqshbandiyya: *dhikr lata'if*, *suluk (khalwa)*, *khatm-i khwajagan*, and *rabita bi-l-shaykh*, as well as the injunction to refrain from eating meat during periods of intense spiritual exercise. He showed to his own satisfaction that these had all been introduced by later mystics, and therefore were without basis in the practice of the Prophet and the Companions. Adding such devotions on one's own account, he held, amounts to a denial of the divine commandments and is therefore an extremely reprehensible form of *bid'a*.

Ahmad Khatib's attacks made a great impact in his native West Sumatra, which then probably was the region with the highest density of Naqshbandi shaykhs in the Archipelago. His writings were at once countered with apologetic tracts by the Minangkabau Naqshbandi shaykhs Muhammad Sa'd bin Tanta' of Mungka and Ahmad Khatib's own student Khatib Ali (Muhammad 'Ali b. 'Abd al-Muttalib). These Malay tracts reiterated the standard arguments of Arabic apologetic literature purporting to demonstrate the scriptural foundations of Naqshbandi ritual, which were new to Indonesian audiences but apparently not sufficient to counter Ahmad Khatib's arguments.<sup>[10]</sup> Aware that the greatest threat probably did not lie in the rational arguments put forward by their opponent but in his great prestige, some Naqshbandis requested another great authority, Sayyid Usman, who was known to dislike Ahmad Khatib, to write a refutation of the latter's *Izhar*. The Arab scholar sent them a copy of one of his own anti-Naqshbandi tracts, which can hardly have been much help.

Ahmad Khatib's arguments were to be reiterated by many subsequent critics, and even at much later times Naqshbandi shaykhs still felt the need to write refutations of Ahmad Khatib's works. The most recent example known to me was completed in 1981.<sup>[11]</sup>

Not long after Ahmad Khatib's tracts, the influence of the Egyptian reformists also began to spread in Indonesia, and with it a more radical rejection of *taqlid* and *wasila*, principles without which no tarekat is thinkable. A new generation of radical reformists, who came to be known as the *kaum muda*, the 'young generation', assertively set the terms for the debate. They challenged the traditionalists in public debates, frequently using uncommonly

scornful language. In their journal *Al-Munir* — the name is a tribute to their primary source of inspiration, *Al-Manar* — they attacked numerous traditional practices, from rituals for the dead to the audible pronunciation of the *niyya* before prayer, from the exclusive determination of beginning and end of the month by *ru'ya* to the performing of the *zuhr* prayer following Friday prayer if there were fewer than 40 participants. Among the *tarekat*-related practices that the journal specifically targeted were *ziyara*, especially if the purpose was to do a vow or request intercession, visualising the shaykh to establish spiritual rapport (*rabita bi-l-shaykh*), reciting *dhikr* according to certain specifications (*kayfiyya*) in order to acquire specific desired results, and reciting it rhythmically and/or on a given melody.<sup>[12]</sup> One of the most learned and fiercest polemicists contributing to *Al-Munir* was a student of Ahmad Khatib, Abdul Karim ibn Muhammad Amrullah alias Haji Rasul (in retrospect best remembered as the father of the famous modernist Muslim leader Hamka). He wrote two tracts in which he attacked the Naqshbandiyya and especially its apologist Khatib Ali even more sharply than his teacher had done.<sup>[13]</sup>

Ironically, a generation earlier it had been Naqshbandi shaykhs who had come into conflict with local tradition, opposing the *adat* authorities and the more 'indigenised' tarekat Shattariyya alike in the name of scripturalist Islam (Schrieke 1921:263-5). Forced into the defensive by more radical reformists, several Naqshbandi shaykhs were to enter new alliances with the *adat* faction.

A more moderate criticism of the Naqshbandiyya was made by Shaykh Muhammad Jamil Jambek (1862-1947), who also had been a student of Ahmad Khatib in Mecca but had studied with several more traditionalist teachers as well. He published a two-volume book on the Naqshbandiyya that owes much to Ahmad Khatib but gives on the whole a more balanced representation of the tarekat and is more careful in formulating criticism.<sup>[14]</sup> One of his arguments is that Naqshbandi sources themselves admit that their tarekat has, besides the *silsila* through Abu Bakr, a parallel one through `Ali, the two coming together in the person of `Ali al-Farmadhi. Jambek concludes that this appears to invalidate the claim that the tarekat represents the special teachings of Muhammad to Abu Bakr. He further remarks upon the gaps in time between successive *murshids* in the early part of the Naqshbandiyya *silsila*, finding the theory of initiation by the *ruhaniyya* of a predecessor very unconvincing. He also scrutinises the Qur'anic verses and the *hadith* adduced by Naqshbandi apologists in defense of their devotions and rituals, and concludes that the apologists have recourse to self-serving, idiosyncratic exegeses for which there is no solid foundation. His criticism does not imply a



wholesale rejection of the *tarekat* but sounds more like an appeal for its reform.

*Reformist and nationalist organisations as rivals to the tarekat*

Discussion of the polemics in West Sumatra has taken us ahead in time. We shall return to Java now and to the first decades of the present century. The first two major reformist organisations both were established in Java, *Muhammadiyah* in Yogyakarta in 1912 and *Al Irsyad* in Batavia (Jakarta) in 1913. Muhammadiyah was primarily a benevolent association, establishing schools and later also hospitals, and working hard to raise the religious awareness of the Javanese and inculcate moral values through public sermons (*tabligh*). Its founding members hailed from circles close to the court of Yogyakarta, an environment known as syncretistic. Around 1925, the first important Muhammadiyah branch outside Java was established in West Sumatra by the aforementioned Minangkabau reformist Haji Rasul. His numerous students helped the organisation to spread rapidly through the entire region.

Much of Muhammadiyah's energies was directed at the reform of practices that were part of everyday religious life in Java but which it considered as alien to Islam. This included numerous practices that were important to tarekat followers, such as the *ziyara* (visit to graves, especially to request favours), the *slametan* (ritual meal, with food symbolically offered the spirits of the deceased) and all forms of Islamic magic. Muhammadiyah has not, to my knowledge, come into conflict with any *tarekat* as such — although numerous Muhammadiyah members tend to be quite scornful of the *tarekat* as representing primitive misconceptions of Islam. In fact, Muhammadiyah never had any serious objections to Ghazalian brands of Sufism, and in recent times it is not unusual in Muhammadiyah mosques for prayers to be concluded with a brief *dhikr*.<sup>[15]</sup>

Al Irsyad was born of a conflict within the conservative Arab benevolent association Djamiat Chair (al-Jam`iyya al-Khayriyya). The reformists, led by the Sudanese teacher Ahmad Surkati, broke away and established their own educational organisation, strongly influenced by the Egyptian reformists, Muhammad `Abduh and Rashid Riha. Its membership practically consisted of Indonesian Arabs only, but its influence spread well beyond that circle, which was especially due to the highly respected Surkati. Al Irsyad was a distinctly non-Sufi organisation, but it never made Sufi practices a major target of its reformist efforts.<sup>[16]</sup>

In Java it was not Muslim reformism as such but nationalism that

caused the tarekat to lose a considerable part of their following. The first nationalist mass organisation, *Sarekat Islam* (established in 1912), found a devoted following in precisely those social circles that had been recruiting grounds for the *tarekat*. Initially an organisation of Muslim traders, it soon passed into the control of modernist Muslim nationalists and gained a vast following among Java's peasant masses, who flocked to it with often strong millenarian expectations. [17]

By the end of the 1910s the membership of many local Sarekat Islam branches overlapped with the following of *tarekat* shaykhs. Some *tarekat* shaykhs in fact became Sarekat branch presidents. Conflicts between two types of leaders of the *umma*, the nationalist politicians and the traditionalist *tarekat* shaykhs, were almost inevitable, as both types thought the other was attempting to subvert its authority. B.J.O. Schrieke, who at the time was the Dutch Indies government's adviser on native and Muslim affairs, gives a lively account of the power struggle between certain branch leaders in the island of Madura, who also were *tarekat* shaykhs, and the reformist-minded central board members in nearby Surabaya (Schrieke 1919). In due time this conflict assumed the appearance of a doctrinal one between Muslim reformism and the *tarekat*, with accusations of false teachings and cheating etc., but the underlying struggle between two classes of leaders remained very much in evidence.

As elsewhere, there was in Indonesia a certain, though far from strict, correlation between Muslim modernism and reformism on the one hand, and nationalist activism on the other. In the mid-1920s, the Sarekat Islam leaders became involved in Muslim internationalism. They convened a series of All-Islam Congresses, in which most currents of Indonesian Islam were represented and at which matters of common interest were discussed.<sup>[18]</sup> Many of these matters concerned developments abroad, notably the rise of anti-imperialist movements among Muslims. Neither the Sultan-Caliph Mehmed V Reshad nor the Sharif Husayn, both seen as British stooges, evoked much sympathy among Indonesia's Muslim politicians. It was Mustafa Kemal and `Abd al-`Aziz Ibn Sa`ud whom they saw not only as the saviours of their own nations but as the potential new leaders of the entire Muslim world.

When the Indonesian All-Islam Congress was invited to send a delegation to the first Muslim World Congress in Mecca, sponsored by Ibn Sa`ud in 1926, however, its participants became divided over the attitude to be adopted towards Ibn Sa`ud's suppression of traditional religious teachings and practices (*taqlid*, *ziyara*, etc.). Traditionalists demanded that the delegates plead with Ibn Sa`ud for tolerance, but the modernist and reformist-minded were little inclined

to defend practices that they themselves disapproved of. This circumstance caused the traditionalists to break away and establish their own organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). This was not explicitly an organisation of Sufis, and it was not associated with any specific tarekat, but most of its leaders practised at least privately some Sufi-type devotions. NU, primarily based in Java, developed into the largest grassroots organisation in the Muslim world (van Bruinessen 1994b).

### *Traditionalists' modern response: organisation*

The establishment of Nahdlatul Ulama was a traditionalist reaction to reformism but at the same time it represented an important innovation in traditional Muslim circles. The most respected traditional *`alim* of the time, Hasjim Asj'ari, had to issue a *fatwa* with numerous Qur'anic quotations to demonstrate the licitness of establishing such a modern-type association of *`ulama*. Not surprisingly perhaps, the association became itself a channel for moderate reform, especially in education.

The same was true of the Minangkabau-based traditionalist association, *Perti* (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Association for Muslim Education), which was formally established in 1930.<sup>[19]</sup> Perti's founders were involved in educational reform but in matters of doctrine and worship they tended to be more traditionalist than their Javanese counterparts. Naqshbandi teachers played a prominent part in Perti, the most influential of them being Sulaiman Ar-Rasuli, who was one of Perti's two most charismatic leaders. After Indonesia's independence, both NU and Perti transformed themselves into political parties.

Traditionalist and generally sympathetic towards Sufism though these organisations were, they also made firm efforts to guard orthodoxy within their own ranks, and their conception of orthodoxy owed at least something to reformist critiques of traditional practices. During the first decades of their existence, the major debates involving *tarekat* did not take place between reformists and traditionalists, or between their organisations, but within the traditionalist camp.<sup>[20]</sup> Both sides in the major debates of this period were Sufis or at least favourable to *tasawwuf*; opponents typically objected to specific elements in the other side's teachings, while proclaiming support for Sufism as such. Competition for the same disciples appears to have been a major cause of these conflicts.

### *The Tijaniyya in Java, 1928-1931*

This was for instance the case with a conflict that arose within NU

when in the late 1920s the *tarekat* Tijaniyya rapidly expanded in the Cirebon area on Java's north coast, to some extent at the expense of established teachers of other orders (Pijper 1934). The chief propagators were Kiai Anas of Buntet, a scion of an influential family of `ulama in Cirebon, and a Medina-born, Azhar-educated Arab `alim, who had been a teacher and bookseller in various parts of western Java, `Ali b. `Abdallah al-Tayyib. Kiai Anas had returned from study in the Hijaz in 1927, having received an *ijaza* to teach the Tijaniyya from Shaykh Alfa Hashim (Muhammad al-Hashimi) in Medina. `Ali b. `Abdallah al-Tayyib too held an *ijaza* from Alfa Hashim, granted in 1916, besides an earlier one from Shaykh Adam b. M. Sha'ib al-Barnawi. In Indonesia, al-Tayyib authorised several kiai in the wider Cirebon region to teach the Tijaniyya. As instruction material for new initiates, moreover, he published an abbreviated edition of Ahmad b. Baba al-Shinqiti's *Munyat al-murid*, a simple work on the principles of the Tijaniyya.<sup>[21]</sup>

The Tijaniyya spread rapidly, perhaps (as suggested by Pijper) because of the relatively simple discipline it demanded from those joining it, perhaps also because of the extraordinary promise of certain salvation. Teachers of the Naqshbandiyya and the Qadiriyya, who lost disciples to this newly arrived order, singled out especially these two aspects in their polemical attacks on the Tijaniyya. Between 1928 and 1931 a heated debate went on, pro- and anti-Tijani teachers insulting each other in sermons and pamphlets. Interestingly, some opponents accused the Tijaniyya of being Wahhabis (a label applied rather indiscriminately to reformists of all shades in Indonesia);<sup>[22]</sup> Tijanis in defense pointed out that the Sa`udi regime had forbidden Shaykh Alfa Hashim to recite their *wird* in Medina.

It is perhaps significant that the one scholar who wrote a learned refutation of certain teachings of the Tijaniyya was not an Indonesian but a respected Meccan scholar then residing in Java, `Abdallah b. Sadaqa Dahlan.<sup>[23]</sup> The Indonesian opponents of the order appeared to be more concerned with what they perceived to be unfair competition than with deviations from doctrinal purity. Dahlan's tract, *Tanbih al-ghafil*,<sup>[24]</sup> largely restricts itself to a critique of `Ali al-Tayyib's edition of the *Munyat al-murid* and of another basic Tijani work, `Umar b. Sa'id al-Futi's *Rimah hizb al-rahim*, and attempts to disprove the Tijaniyya's claims of superiority over all other orders. Analysing the Tijaniyya's most important prayers, the *wahifa* and the *haylala*, Dahlan finds there only a few words that cannot be found in the prayers of other orders and asks mockingly if it is because of these few words (*salam Allah* and the *salawat jawharat al-kamal*) that Tijanis are guaranteed entry to Paradise. The claim that the Tijanis will be treated with distinction on the Day of Judgement is refuted

with a barrage of quotations from Qur'an and hadith, and the order's claims of Ahmad al-Tijani's superior *walaya* are rejected because these would imply imperfections in the Prophet.

The way in which these debates between apologists and opponents of the Tijaniyya were ended is also instructive. Protagonists of both sides were members of NU or had close relations with NU leaders, so that the conflict threatened to divide this organisation. Kiai Abbas of Buntet, the elder brother of the Tijani teacher Kiai Anas, was a leading member of Nahdlatul Ulama, and in 1931 this organisation held its sixth congress in Cirebon, in Kiai Abbas' *pesantren* (boarding school) at Buntet. One of the questions discussed by the assembled `ulama concerned the orthodoxy of the Tijaniyya. Not wishing to antagonise the host, the NU board found a compromise formula that allowed followers and opponents to peacefully coexist. The prayers (*wird*, *salawat*, *istighfar*, etc.) of the order were declared orthodox, as well as all of its teachings that were clearly in agreement with the *shari`a*. As for teachings that seemingly were in conflict with the *shari`a*, if they allowed metaphorical interpretation (*ta'wil*), judgement was to be left to experts of the *tariqa*; it was only where such interpretation was impossible that they were declared sinful. This compromise formula, which the Tijanis preferred to interpret as an endorsement, did not entirely silence the opponents,<sup>[25]</sup> but it took the sting out of the debates.

### *Haji Jalaluddin's Naqshbandi apology and his tarekat party*

Another debate, starting in the 1940s, divided the Naqshbandi teachers of West Sumatra but sent reverberations across the Archipelago. The immediate cause of the debate was the emergence on the scene of a young and ambitious Naqshbandi teacher, Haji Jalaluddin of Bukittinggi. He was the first tarekat teacher of a new type, a product of Dutch education rather than the *surau* (*madrasa*); he made his living as a schoolteacher and became a highly productive writer. One of his first books had been a 'scientific' apology of Islam, finding in the textbook physics of his day confirmation of God's words in the Qur'an. By regularly associating with Perti `ulama he had gradually assimilated some knowledge of Arabic and the Muslim sciences. During the 1930s he was close to Perti's leading Naqshbandi shaykh, Sulaiman Ar-Rasuli, and he acquired a position of influence in Perti. In or around 1940 he published the first of a long series of, mostly apologetic and polemical, books and brochures on the Naqshbandiyya, which were to invite much criticism but also brought him numerous disciples.<sup>[26]</sup>



Some of Jalaluddin's colleagues, including Shaykh Sulaiman Ar-Rasuli, were less than happy with his defense of the tarekat against reformist criticism, for his writings contained in their view a number of serious errors. Most of these errors had nothing to do with the books' central subject matter, the *tariqa* (the `ulama were incensed, for instance, at Jalaluddin's writing that the Prophet had received *sadaqa* in his lifetime). One senses in the `ulama's attitude a certain irritation at this upstart without proper traditional education treading on a field that they considered as uniquely theirs. They had to admit that Jalaluddin wrote well, and that his books found an eager audience, which must have added to the irritation. When Jalaluddin refused to withdraw or correct his books, he was expelled from Perti.

In 1945, briefly after Indonesia's declaration of independence, Perti reconstituted itself as a political party, Partai Islam Perti. Haji Jalaluddin challenged his colleagues by establishing his own political organisation, the *Partai Politik Tarekat Islam* (PPTI) and even an armed militia force, the *Barisan Tentara Allah* ('Guards of God's Army'), which following the first Dutch military action (1947) was integrated in the national guerrilla front.<sup>[27]</sup> Keeping the initiative in other fields as well, Haji Jalaluddin began publishing a new series of books, which constituted a sort of correspondence course in the Naqshbandiyya. His *Rahasia mutiara* ('The secret of the pearl') is one of the clearest and most explicit books explaining the techniques and rituals of the Naqshbandiyya, with unique pictures showing the location of the *lata'if* and the trajectory of the *dhikr nafi wa ithbat* through the body.<sup>[28]</sup> His description (or prescription?) of the initiation (*bay`a*) ritual, however, contains some elements that appear to be new, which did not fail to renew the anger of his rivals.

As carried out by Haji Jalaluddin, and described in his book, *bay`a* is a real initiatory ritual, in which the murid symbolically dies, experiences an intermediate state and is reborn. One begins with a purifying bath (*ghusl li-l-tawba*) and prayers for forgiveness; then one is covered with a shroud and must imagine oneself dead and buried, and is put to sleep in the position of the grave. In sleep one should have one of twenty dreams or visions (such as meeting with one of the masters of the *silsila* and receiving instruction from him; dreaming of receiving intercession from the *murshid* on the Day of Resurrection). If there is no dream, the procedure has to be repeated the following nights until a dream comes. Next morning, after *subh* prayer, the *murid* meets face to face with the *murshid* for instruction in the *dhikr*.<sup>[29]</sup>



In 1954, Perti organised a *tarekat* conference, attended by some 200 Naqshbandiyya-affiliated `ulama, to discuss and condemn Haji Jalaluddin's books. The assembled `ulama issued a *fatwa* declaring the books *haram* for readers without sufficient religious knowledge, because they contained serious doctrinal errors and reprehensible innovations (*bid`a*).<sup>[30]</sup> Sulaiman Ar-Rasuli followed this up with a brochure, *Tabligh al-amana*, in which he pointed out 33 'major errors' in Jalaluddin's books. These included a misinterpretation of the verse *wa la yadhkurun Allah illa qalilan* as implying that neglecting *dhikr* amounts to unbelief, the assertion that devotional acts inspired by dreams can legitimately be performed, the explanation of *tawhid* as referring to the unity of God's essence and that of all prophets, and the *bid`a* of the initiation ritual.<sup>[31]</sup> In criticising Haji Jalaluddin, Shaykh Sulaiman Ar-Rasuli came to adopt a position close to that of Ahmad Khatib, and it is not surprising that he was quoted extensively, along with the latter, in an anti-Naqshbandi book published in 1961.<sup>[32]</sup>

It is hard to imagine that these 'errors' were in themselves sufficient to warrant the concerted assault on Haji Jalaluddin. One extra-religious factor that should be taken into account is the fact that Indonesia's first democratic elections (to be held in 1955) were approaching and that Perti and PPTI were courting the same segments of the electorate. Jalaluddin was working hard to turn PPTI into a nation-wide formation. PPTI made a reasonable showing in North and Central Sumatra, in some districts getting as much as ten per cent of the vote, and Jalaluddin was voted into parliament. In the following years he answered his opponents with a new barrage of polemical tracts and to a considerable extent outflanked them through diligent use of his political contacts.

Haji Jalaluddin was a staunch supporter and flatterer of Sukarno, and he was rewarded for his loyalty. When Sukarno dissolved parliament and replaced it by a handpicked assembly and people's congress, Haji Jalaluddin was made a member of both, no longer representing PPTI but the `ulama as a 'functional group'. He became one of Sukarno's Muslim apologists, probably as much out of conviction as for reasons of expedience. His dubbing Sukarno's politics 'tarekat Sukarnowiyah' and proclaiming them to be in agreement with other orthodox *tarekat* no doubt made it easier for him to go on organising his own following.<sup>[33]</sup>

PPTI gave up its existence as a party in 1961 and became a non-political association of *tarekat* shaykhs and followers.<sup>[34]</sup> In the

1960s it experienced rapid expansion throughout Indonesia, partly by recruiting people affiliated with all other orthodox (*mu'tabar*) orders, partly through Haji Jalaluddin's appointing numerous *khalifa* and his liberally bestowing the title of doctor on those who subscribed to his never-ending series of brochures. In some distant places he appointed persons as his *khalifa* whom he had never met face to face. Others joined his organisation as a profession of loyalty towards the established order, out of fear of being taken for political opponents, or for other mundane, opportunistic reasons.<sup>[35]</sup>

Haji Jalaluddin's opponents were gradually silenced, not because they were convinced by the power of his written arguments but because he became too big to have to care much about them. The fall of Sukarno hardly affected him, for his PPTI had in time affiliated itself with the 'functional group' umbrella organisation Golkar, which under Suharto de facto became the governing party. PPTI thus was, and remains, the sole representative and mouthpiece of *tarekat* at the government level. Like many leaders of his ilk, Haji Jalaluddin did not tolerate strong personalities around him and never groomed a successor for fear he might lose power himself. After his death in 1976, PPTI soon declined in importance and moreover split into rival factions. Since then, it has not taken part in any, even minor, debates on Sufism and *tarekat*.<sup>[36]</sup>

*Against syncretism: the apologetic adoption of reformist standpoints by tarekat teachers*

Reformist Muslims during most of this century engaged not so much Sufism or specific Sufi orders as such, but certain practices and beliefs. Much of the debate (somewhat one-sided in this respect) has been concerned with *wahdat al-wujud* metaphysics, which in the view of its opponents encouraged people to disregard the *shari'a*. In fact, only few contemporary Indonesian *tarekat* followers adhere to *wahdat al-wujud* in any form. The real target of these polemics were Indonesia's majority of nominal ('*abangan*') Muslims. Until its physical destruction and the mass murder of its members in 1965-66, the Communist Party of Indonesia had found its strongest support among *abangan* workers and villagers. Reformist Muslims, opposed to communism as well as laxity in religious performance, tended to identify these two, as well as to lump *tarekat* and *abangan* mystical movements together.<sup>[37]</sup>

Among Java's nominal Muslims there exists a wide range of mystical movements (commonly called *aliran kebatinan*, esoteric movements). Since the 1930s these have had more or less formal

structures somewhat resembling the tarekat (but no *silsila* connecting them with the Prophet of Islam). Some of them are explicitly non-Islamic, others consider themselves as Muslim, but none prescribe their followers to live according to the *shari`a*. These *aliran kebatinan* have often aroused the missionary zeal of reformist Muslims, who have felt it their moral duty to save their countrymen from damnation in the hereafter and the seductions of 'communism' in this world.<sup>[38]</sup>

In order to disassociate themselves from the syncretistic *kebatinan* sects (and, after 1965, to evade the dangerous suspicion of harbouring communist sympathies), Javanese teachers of the Qadiriyya, Naqshbandiyya, Shadhiliyya and other internationally recognised tarekat organised themselves in the NU-affiliated *Jam`iyyat ahl al-tariqa al-mu`tabara*. This association was formally established in 1957 but only became influential in the 1970s. Its very name represented an apology, a disclaimer of belonging to what the reformists objected to: only those *tarekat* that respected the *shari`a* and had a convincing *silsila* were considered as *mu`tabar*, respectable, i.e. orthodox.<sup>[39]</sup>

One of the major conflicts over which the Jam`iyya has been divided during the past decades once again concerned the Tijaniyya. The 'respectability' of this order was called into question during the 1980s because of the claim that its founder, Ahmad al-Tijani, received his initiation directly from the Prophet (whom he is believed to have met with while fully awake), and because of certain extravagant claims about the merits of its distinctive devotions, but especially because it took disciples away from other tarekat teachers. Opponents had recourse to the same theological arguments as in the 1930s debate, and Dahlan's book was reprinted in the original as well as in Indonesian and Madurese translations and widely distributed. Interestingly, the fiercest opponents of the Tijaniyya were not reformists but mystical teachers who were more strongly inclined towards syncretism and towards recourse to Islamic magic than the aggressively proselytising Tijaniyya teachers.<sup>[40]</sup>

## Conclusion

Most of the conflicts involving Sufi orders in the twentieth century were to a large extent conflicts between different types of leaders, who shored up their authority with different claims to legitimacy and each of whom attempted to delegitimise the other. Some of the most severe conflicts were, in fact, not between Sufis and anti-*tasawwuf*

reformists but between rival *tarekat* shaykhs. The reformists' attitude towards Sufism has not been uniformly negative. Numerous followers of Indonesia's largest reformist organisation, Muhammadiyah, subscribe to what the popular Muhammadiyah leader, Hamka, termed 'modern *tasawwuf*', i.e. a Sufi attitude without the trappings of an organised *tarekat*. And some of the organised *tarekat* are in fact finding a new following in circles often considered as the natural constituency of reformism, the geographically and socially mobile, educated segments of the population, students and young professionals. Polemical writings from the first half of this century against or in defense of the *tarekat* are still regularly reprinted, but they appear to have little impact on their growth or decline.

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[1] The exceptions were a possible early Shattari influence in Aceh and the introduction of the Rifa'iyya and the Qadiriyya there by the Indian Nur al-Din al-Raniri. The Khalwatiyya was first introduced by Yusuf Makassar, who had studied in Medina for many years but 'took' this particular order in Damascus. For an overview of the development of the various orders, see van Bruinessen 1994c.

[2] It is probably not Geertz but Robert Jay (1957) who should be credited with first introducing these terms into the scholarly literature. Geertz' work, however, has had a much greater impact. Although Geertz' analyses have been subject to much criticism, at least some of it justified, his description of religious behaviour in Java (1960) remains a very valuable study.

[3] Many of these allegedly non-Islamic practices are also recorded in two orientalist classics discussing popular religion in Egypt and Algeria, respectively: Edward William Lane's *An account of the manners and customs of the modern Egyptians* (1836) and Edmond Doutté's *Magie & religion dans l'Afrique du Nord* (1908).

[4] The response of *kebatinan* mystics to Muslim reformism is outside the scope of this article. The second half of the nineteenth century was a period of significant expansion of scripturalist and *shari`a*-oriented Islam at the expense of syncretism. In reaction to reformist agitation, the indifferent attitude of certain *kebatinan* circles towards the *shari`a* and its representatives turned distinctly hostile, resulting in the production of anti-Muslim literature (see e.g. Drewes 1966). This assertive response never affected Sufi apologetics, however.

[5] Judging by the collections of *isnad* published by the late dean of the (Indonesian) Dar al-`ulum al-diniyya in Mecca, Shaykh Yasin Padang (Yasin al-Fadani), `Abd al-Samad's name occurs as frequently in the *isnad* of *fiqh* texts studied by Indonesian `ulama as in those of *tasawwuf* works (e.g. al-Fadani 1401/1981). The only extant biographical notice on Ahmad Khatib Sambas, in a work on Meccan `ulama of the 14th century of the *hijra*, describes him as a *faqih*, who had studied with the most prominent Meccan representatives of the Shafi`i, Hanafi and Maliki *madhhab* (`Abd al-Jabbar 1385:74).

[6] Salim b. `Abdallah b. Sumayr (d. 1883 in Batavia) is still known in Indonesia for his simple Malay textbook of *fiqh* and doctrine, *Safinat al-najah*, which is used until this day and on which several Indonesian `ulama have written commentaries (see van Bruinessen 1990b:248).

[7] On Sayyid Usman and his anti-Naqshbandi treatises see: Snouck Hurgronje 1887; von de Wall 1893. Snouck summarises the pamphlets *Al-nasihah al-aniqa li-l-mutalabbisin bi-l-tariqa* and *Al-wathiqat al-wafiyya fi `uluww sha'n tariqat al-Sufiyya*; von de Wall a later pamphlet *Arti tarekat dengan pendek bicaranya* ('The meaning of the tarekat in a nutshell', Batavia, 1889), which appears to be largely if not entirely identical with the former.

[8] Ahmad Khatib Minangkabau (on whom see `Abd al-Jabbar 1385:37-44) is generally considered as the father of Indonesian twentieth-century reformism and an uncompromising opponent of all forms of *bid'a*. In matters of *fiqh*,

however, he remained within the Shafi'i *madhhab*.

[9] *Izhar zaghl al-kadhibin fi tashabbuhihim bi-l-sadiqin; Al-ayat al-bayyinat li-l-munsifin fi izala khurafat ba'd al-muta'assibin; Al-sayf al-battar fi mahq kalimat ba'd ahl al-ightirar* (all three in Malay). Printed together Cairo, 1326/1908; several reprints. These works are discussed in Schrieke 1921:268-70 and Shellabear 1930. The first of these tracts was republished in latinised script as recently as 1978 in A.Mm. Arief (ed.), *Fatwa tentang: Tharikat Naqasyabandiyah*. Medan: Islamiyah (4th printing). `Abd al-Jabbar (1385:43) also mentions an Arabic anti-Naqshbandi tract, *Tanbih al-ghafil bi-suluk tariqat al-awa'il*.

[10] The tracts are briefly discussed in Schrieke 1921:270-2. Shaykh Sa'd bin Tanta' wrote *Irgham unuf al-muta'annitin fi inkarihim rabitat al-wasilin* and the more elaborate *Risala tanbih al-'awamm 'ala taghrirat ba'd al-anam* (Padang 1326/1908). Shaykh Khatib Ali first published a Malay translation of an apologetic treatise by Sayyid Muhammad b. Mahdi al-Kurdi, *Risala naqshiyah fi asas istilah al-naqshbandiyya min al-dhikr al-khafiyy wa-l-rabita wa-l-muraqaba wa difa' al-i'tirad bi dhalik* (Padang 1326/1908), and an adaptation of `Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi's *Miftah al-ma'iyya*, titled *Kitab miftah al-sadiqiyya fi istilah al-naqshbandiyya* (Padang).

[11] Haji Yahya bin Laksemana, *Lisan Naqshbandiyah: untuk membanteras risala bagi Syekh Ahmad Khatib* ('The tongue of the Naqshbandiyya: to annihilate the tract by Shaykh Ahmad Khatib'), Kajang, Selangor, Malaysia, 1981. It takes up point by point the issues raised in *Izhar zaghl al-kadhibin*.

[12] On the conflicts between the *kaum muda* and the traditional `ulama or *kaum tua*, and specifically on *Al-Munir* see Hamka 1982: 99-111.

[13] *Izhar asatir al-mudallin fi tashabbuhihim bi-l-muhtadin* and *Al-suyuf al-qati'a fi'l-da'awi al-kadhiba*, both in Malay (Schrieke 1921:313).

[14] Muhammad Jamil Jambek, *Penerangan tentang asal usul tarekat an-naqsyabandiyah dan segala yang berhubungan dengan dia* ('Explanations on the origins of the Naqshbandi order and everything related to it') 2 vols., Bukittinggi: Zainoel Abidin, no date [1930s ?].

[15] See the observations by Nakamura (1977) on the performance of *dhikr* by his Muhammadiyah respondents. During the last few decades, Muhammadiyah reformists and traditionalists have at times reached surprising forms of accommodation. In the 1970s and 1980s, there was in West Sumatra a Naqshbandi shaykh who was also an active Muhammadiyah member (personal communication from Dr. M. Sanusi Latief, Padang).

[16] "[Surkati] had no objections [...] against al-Ghazali's *tasawwuf*, but he did object to certain extreme expressions of Sufism and of certain *turuq*." (Pijper 1977:120).

[17] The millenarian aspect of Sarekat Islam in its first years is especially emphasised in Korver's study (1982). Shiraishi (1990), concentrating on a later period, focuses on the political radicalism to which one Sarekat wing owed much popular support.

[18] See van Bruinessen 1995a, where the developments briefly sketched here are discussed in greater detail.

[19] The founders of Perti were traditionalist `ulama who had been active in the West Sumatran branches of Sarekat Islam during the 1910s but lost leading positions to reformist rivals. As an organisation Perti was preceded by an ephemeral Union of Sumatran `Ulama, in which the same persons were involved. The history of Minangkabau traditionalism is traced in Latief 1988.

[20] During the 1930s and 1940s there was in fact a growing convergence between the reformist and traditionalist camps, as the former implicitly accepted certain ideas originally associated with the reformists, and the latter toned down their criticism of *taqlid* and the *madhhab*. It was only after independence, when the two were represented by rival political parties, that the religious debate between them became exacerbated again.

[21] *Kitab munyat al-murid li `allama zamanih al-mashhur bi-bn Baba al-Shinqiti al-`Alawi al-musamma bi-l-Tijani* (Tasikmalaya, 1346/1928). Pijper (1934:100) suggests that among ordinary Indonesian followers of the order this was the most widely used Tijani text, but he lists various others that were also known (ibid.:104).

[22] This accusation probably was based on the Tijaniyya's forbidding its followers *ziyara* to non-Tijani shrines and the recitation of any but the prayers of the order itself, which meant a repudiation of traditional practices.

[23] `Abdallah b. Sadaqa Dahlan was a close relative of the famous shaykh al-`ulama and Shaf'i *mufti* of Mecca, Ahmad b. Zayni Dahlan, which no doubt contributed to his prestige in Southeast Asia. Before coming to Java he had been the *mufti* of the Malay kingdom of Kedah; later he had led an Arab school in Batavia.

[24] *Tanbih al-ghafil wa irshad al-mustafid al-`aqil* (Tasikmalaya 1349/1931), summarised in Pijper 1934:111-6. An abridged version, titled *Wuduh al-dala'il*, was reprinted in the 1980s.

[25] Kiai Muhammad Ismail of Kracak near Cirebon, a shaykh of the Qadiriyya wa Naqshbandiyya who had lost many disciples to the Tijaniyya, published a last fierce attack on the Tijaniyya in 1932, but it contained no new arguments (Pijper 1934:118-20).

[26] *Pertahanan ath-thariqat an-naqsyabandiyah* ('Defense of the Naqshbandi order'). 4 vols. Bukittinggi, 1940.

[27] Effendi 1990:91-2. Hamka, in the fourth volume of his autobiography *Kenang2-an hidup* (Jakarta, 1975<sup>3</sup>:96), explains the establishment of the Barisan Tentera Allah as born from fear lest the reformist Muhammadiyah might become the dominating force in the region after independence and ban *tarekat* activities.

[28] The first volume of *Rahasia mutiara: ath-thariqat an-naqsyabandiyah* probably appeared in the early 1950s, its sixth and last volume in 1961. It was regularly reprinted.

[29] *Rahasia mutiara*, vol. 1:5-16.

[30] This *fatwa* is reprinted in Arief 1978[1961].

[31] *Tabligh al-amana fi izalat al-munkarat wa-l-shubuhah* (in Malay). Bukittinggi, 1954, pp. 23, 13-4, 22 and 18-20, respectively.

[32] Arief 1978[1961]. This book, though primarily targeting Jalaluddin, whose star was rising rapidly at the time, is directed against the Naqshbandiyya as such.

[33] The term 'tarekat Sukarnowiyah' occurs in the tract *Tiga serangkai* ('Three inseparable friends'), which was published in 1964 as an answer to certain critics. A year earlier, in a tract named *Pembelaan Tharikat Islam Naksjabandijah*, vol. 4, Jalaluddin had gone so far as to ask whether Sukarno was the Mahdi. He stopped short of giving an affirmative answer but asserted that all signs were present.

[34] It had of course to change its name but retained the same initials, which henceforth stood for *Persatuan Pengamal Tarekat Islam*, 'Union of Devotees of Islamic Tarekat'. In the 1970s several more changes of name followed, *Pengamal* being replaced by *Penganut* ('Followers') and, after a split in the organisation, variously by *Pembela* ('Defenders'), *Pembina* ('Promoters') and *Pejuang* ('Partisans').

[35] I have not been able to find solid confirmation of the claims of some of my informants that Haji Jalaluddin's *khalifas* and PPTI board members were given special cards with photographs of Haji Jalaluddin and Sukarno, which gave them free travel in public transport.

[36] The vicissitudes of PPTI in Sukarno's and Suharto's Indonesia are narrated in Effendi 1990.

[37] One of the few reformist critics who had actually studied *tarekat* literature was the Minangkabau journalist Joesoef Sou'yb (1976, 1988). He criticised not only Javanese mystical sects (*aliran kebatinan*) for their monist views but also the tarekat Naqshbandiyya, the latter on the grounds that M. b. `Abdallah al-Khani's well-known manual *Al-bahja al-saniyya* espouses *wahdat al-wujud*. Few Indonesian Naqshbandis, however, embrace *wahdat al-wujud*, and even fewer subscribe to the vulgar interpretation Sou'yb attributed to them.

[38] The combination of Muslim reformist agitation and New Order anticommunism has forced these mystical movements to gradually purge all antinomian elements of their teachings and approximate the orthodoxies of the accepted formal religions. On this domestication of the *kebatinan* movements, see Stange 1986.

[39] The history of the Jam`iyyat ahl al-tariqa al-mu`tabara is sketched in my book on the Naqshbandiyya (van Bruinessen 1994a).

[40] This conflict is discussed at greater length in van Bruinessen 1995b